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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are shown to
be susceptible to adversarial example attacks.
Most existing works achieve this malicious ob-
jective by crafting subtle pixel-wise pertur-
bations, and they are difficult to launch in
the physical world due to inevitable transfor-
mations (e.g., different photographic distances
and angles). Recently, there are a few research
works on generating physical adversarial exam-
ples, but they generally require the details of
the model a priori, which is often impractical.
In this work, we propose a novel physical adver-
sarial attack for arbitrary black-box DNN mod-
els, namely Region-Wise Attack. To be specific,
we present how to efficiently search for region-
wise perturbations to the inputs and determine
their shapes, locations and colors via both top-
down and bottom-up techniques. In addition,
we introduce two fine-tuning techniques to fur-
ther improve the robustness of our attack. Ex-
perimental results demonstrate the efficacy and
robustness of the proposed Region-Wise Attack
in real world.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved the state-
of-the-art performance in many areas, such as image clas-
sification [He et al., 2016; Zoph et al., 2018] and au-
tonomous driving [Chen et al., 2016; Yang et al., 2018].
However, they are found vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ple attacks that fool them into making adversarial deci-
sions by slightly manipulating their inputs [Papernot et
al., 2016; Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Xie et al., 2019;
Yuan et al., 2019], which are serious threats to safety-
critical systems.
Instead of attacking the digital inputs to the DNNs,
physical adversarial attacks manipulate the objects in
real world directly to achieve malicious objectives. The
first such kind of attack was proposed in [Sharif et al.,
2016], in which attackers wear a malicious eye-glasses
to fool the face recognition system to make misclassifi-
cations. In [Eykholt et al., 2018], a physical adversarial
attack was implemented against road sign recognition
systems by generating sticker perturbations and attach-
ing them onto traffic signs. However, these attacks are
launched under white-box settings, in which attackers
need to know the details of the attacked DNN model
(e.g., architectures and trained parameters). This is of-
ten not practical due to the difficulty to obtain the pa-
rameters used in real world systems.
In this work, we propose to generate physical adver-
sarial examples by searching for effective perturbations
in continuous image regions with simple queries of the
targeted DNN model without knowing its details. The
proposed attack, namely Region-Wise Attack, is able to
efficiently (i.e., with a limited number of queries) de-
termine the locations, shapes and colors of the required
perturbations to launch the attack. To further increase
the robustness of Region-Wise Attack, physical misplace-
ment and photography independent fine-tuning mecha-
nisms are introduced to tolerate possible variations in
real world. The physical attack can be launched by stick-
ing the generated perturbations onto targeted objects.
Experimental results on CIFAR-10, GTSRB data sets
and real world road signs demonstrate the efficacy and
robustness of the proposed attack.
The main contributions of this paper include:
• We propose a novel physical adversarial attack for
arbitrary black-box DNNs by generating region-wise
perturbations.
• We present how to efficiently find the shapes, loca-
tions and colors of the region-wise perturbations via
both top-down and bottom-up methods.
• To increase the attack robustness, we introduce two
fine-tuning mechanisms to tolerate possible physical
misplacement and photographic variations in real
world.
2 Related Work and Motivation
In many machine learning systems, attackers can only
manipulate the objects so that the taken images are per-
turbed as expected. This kind of attacks is called phys-
ical attacks. [Sharif et al., 2016] targets to attack the
face recognition systems by generating adversarial eye-
glasses. When people wear them, the system will make
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Figure 1: The overview of our proposed attack method.
misclassifications. [Eykholt et al., 2018] generates ad-
versarial stickers to mimic city graffiti and then attach
these stickers onto road signs to fool self-driving sys-
tems. In [Thys et al., 2019], they propose to craft adver-
sarial patches to mislead the object detection systems.
Recently, [Komkov and Petiushko, 2019] generates rect-
angular perturbations on the hat to fool face ID systems.
However, all the above physical attacks are under
white-box settings, which is often not practical, as it is
difficult to obtain the DNN parameters of real-world sys-
tems. There are also many related black-box attacks pro-
posed in the literature. In [Papernot et al., 2017], they
first train a substitute network of the similar functional-
ity with the targeted DNN, and then craft adversarial ex-
amples against the substitute network under white-box
settings. The generated adversarial examples are used to
attack the targeted DNN based on their transferability.
The ZOO attack [Chen et al., 2017] crafts adversarial ex-
amples by approximating the model gradients, observing
the output changes when varying the inputs. They use
zeroth order optimization method to approximate the
model gradients rather than training a substitute model.
Recently, [Alzantot et al., 2018] proposes the Genattack
to find the adversarial perturbations with genetic al-
gorithms. These attacks craft pixel-wise perturbations
and generally require extensive computational resources
to achieve better transferability. More importantly, they
are less effective for launching physical attacks due to
inevitable physical misplacement and photographic vari-
ations in real world.
Motivated by the above, we propose novel techniques
to launch robust physical adversarial example attacks for
arbitrary black-box DNN systems by efficiently crafting
region-wise perturbations, in which we treat the targeted
DNN as an oracle and only query the outputs for specific
inputs.
3 Crafting Region-wise Perturbations
Crafting region-wise perturbations under black-box set-
tings is very difficult, as we have to determine the per-
turbation color, shape and location. The search space is
extremely large. The perturbation color refers to how to
change the values of the selected regions. For example,
we can set the selected perturbation region of the input
image to the black color and then attach this black stick
onto the object to launch the attack. The perturbations
with different colors, shapes or locations will certainly
result in different attack effects.
The overview of our proposed attack method is shown
in Figure 1, in which we first generate coarse-grained
region-wise perturbations with our top-down or bottom-
up methods iteratively under black-box settings. Then,
to improve the attack robustness in the physical world,
we discuss two fine-tuning techniques to tolerate possible
variations. After that, the crafted region-wise perturba-
tions are attached onto the physical objects so that the
taken images can mislead the attacked DNNs. The key
steps in our method are the top-down, bottom-up tech-
niques and fine-tuning mechanisms, as detailed in the
following sections.
3.1 Top-down Method for Un-targeted
Attacks
For un-targeted adversarial example attacks, the attack
goal is to fool the model into making misclassifications.
The simplest way to achieve this objective is to perturb
the whole object region in the image so that the model
cannot recognize it. However, this is not valid, as per-
turbing the whole object region will certainly raise hu-
man suspicions. Therefore, to successfully launch the at-
tack, we need to shrink the perturbation region to reduce
human attentions. This is the key idea of our top-down
method that shrinks the perturbation regions iteratively
until it cannot mislead the targeted classifier.
In our top-down method, firstly, we will set the pertur-
bation as a specific color and the perturbation region is
initialized as the whole input image. Secondly, we shrink
the perturbation region into some smaller candidate re-
gions. Thirdly, we select the most adversarial ones from
the candidate regions by querying the attacked DNN.
The second and third steps are repeated until the con-
straint on the size of the perturbation region is satisfied.
If the selected color cannot attack successfully under the
constraint, then we will use another color to attack. The
key steps in this process is how to shrink the perturba-
tion regions and how to select the most adversarial ones,
which are detailed in the following subsections.
Region Shrinking. In each iteration, we will gen-
erate some smaller candidate perturbations based on
the current region-wise perturbation, and evaluate their
individual attack capability by querying the targeted
DNN. Some principles should be considered in the re-
gion shrinking process. Firstly, the union of all the gen-
erated smaller candidate regions should cover all parts
of the original region. If not, some parts in the original
region will not be explored and we may miss the optimal
regions. Secondly, we cannot generate too many candi-
dates, otherwise, the number of querying the targeted
DNN will be large.
Considering these two principles, we propose to divide
the original perturbation region horizontally and verti-
cally in each iteration to get four different continuous
candidate regions, the left-half, right-half, top-half and
bottom half parts, respectively. To increase the attack
success rate, we also generate discontinuous candidate
regions, the top-left and bottom-right parts or the top-
right and bottom-left parts, respectively. In each itera-
tion, the region will shrink to its half size, and no parts in
the original region are missed. Figure 2 shows an exam-
ple for the continuous and discontinuous region shrink
strategies, in which the black region will be perturbed.
Continuous shrinking Discontinuous shrinking
Figure 2: The continuous and discontinuous shrinking.
Region Selection. After generating the candidate per-
turbation regions, we need to evaluate their attack capa-
bility and select the most adversarial ones as the search
space for the next iteration. According to the goal of the
un-targeted attack, the region that achieves the mini-
mum prediction probability for the true label should be
selected. It can be formulated as follows:
ri+1 = arg min
ri∈R
ftrue(x + ri), (1)
where ri is a candidate region-wise perturbation in iter-
ation i, x + ri is the image with perturbation ri.
It should be noted that for each attack, we will first
initialize the perturbation color, then we optimize the
region shape and location. If we explore more colors, we
will have a higher chance to attack. However, exploring
more color candidates will certainly increase the attack
cost and it is necessary to obtain a good tradeoff between
the attack cost and performance.
3.2 Bottom-up method for Targeted
Attacks
Although the top-down method is effective for un-
targeted attacks, it is ineffective for the targeted attacks.
The reason is that large perturbation regions can only
fool DNNs into making mistakes but may not necessar-
ily make them misclassify to the targeted malicious label.
As a result, the top-down method that searches from the
large regions to smaller ones is not efficient in this case.
To solve this problem, we propose a bottom-up tech-
nique that starts from small perturbation regions and
then extends them iteratively based on their adversarial
capabilities.
In the bottom-up method, firstly, we initialize the
color of the perturbation, then search the initial effective
perturbation regions among the whole input image with
a fine-grained manner. Secondly, we expand the fine-
grained perturbation regions to different directions, and
generate several candidate regions. Thirdly, we evaluate
these expanded regions based on their attack capabilities
and select the most adversarial ones for the next itera-
tion. The second and third steps are continued until the
constraint on the size of perturbation region is violated.
Next, we introduce these three steps in detail.
Perturbation Region Initialization. The goal of the
perturbation region initialization is to find small appro-
priate regions in the input images as initial locations
for perturbations. We select k initial perturbation re-
gions that achieve the top k prediction probabilities of
the targeted label. If k = 1, we only select the region
with the largest prediction probability of the targeted
label and the perturbation is continuous. However, the
important features for achieving the attack goal may lo-
cate in separate regions. To increase the attack capa-
bility, it is necessary to select several initial regions to
generate discontinuous region-wise perturbations, which
will increase the overhead for the attacks. As a result, at-
tackers can choose the large k whenever possible based
on their attack cost budgets.
We assume that the initial perturbation region is with
the size of n ∗ n. The exhaustive search is used to find
the most adversarial regions, where the stride size is j
(j ≤ n). For example, if size of the original search space
is 9 ∗ 9 and the initial perturbation region is 3 ∗ 3 with
the stride 3, we have to evaluate 9 different perturbation
regions, and any two search regions have no overlaps.
Region Expansion. In each iteration, we will expand
the perturbation region similar to the shrinking step in
the top-down method. We expand the current pertur-
bation regions along four directions (top, bottom, left
and right directions). After each iteration, we expand
the original region into its twice size and get four candi-
date regions for the next region selection step.
Region Selection. In each iteration, the region that
achieves the maximum prediction probability of the tar-
geted label is selected. It can be formulated as follows:
ri+1 = arg max
ri∈R
ftargeted(x + ri), (2)
where x+ ri is the image with region-wise perturbation
ri. ftargeted(x+ ri) denotes the classification probability
of the targeted label given the perturbed input.
It should be noted that the bottom-up method can be
used for un-targeted attacks, but the top-down method
can achieve good attack success rate with less queries.
So in this paper, we only adopt it for targeted attacks.
3.3 Explore More Region-wise Shapes
We can efficiently find the adversarial region to attack
by region-shrinking or region-expansion with the pro-
posed two methods, but the limitation is that the shape
of the region-wise perturbation is always rectangular.
To mitigate this limitation, we propose to explore more
shapes after finding the adversarial regions. The idea is
to search other shapes (such as the triangle, circle, octag-
onal, etc) from the sizes that they are exactly internally
bounded by the generated rectangle, then iteratively in-
crease their sizes until they can externally bound the
rectangle. In this way, we can explore more region-wise
shapes to launch the physical adversarial attack.
4 Physical Fine-tuning Mechanisms
After generating the region-wise perturbations, we need
to launch the physical attack by sticking them onto the
real objects. As in the physical world, there are many un-
avoidable variations, the adversarial examples generated
from input images under certain photography conditions
may fail to attack after sticking. In this section, we in-
troduce two fine-tuning techniques to increase the attack
robustness in the physical world.
4.1 Physical Misplacement Fine-tuning
In practical situations, it is very difficult, if not impos-
sible, to precisely stick the perturbations onto the real
objects as we optimized. For example, it may translate
several pixels. As a result, to improve the attack robust-
ness, it is necessary to fine-tune the perturbation loca-
tions to tolerate possible physical misplacement.
Our key idea is to explore the neighborhood of the gen-
erated perturbations to find the best location that can
tolerate the majority of the physical misplacement. If we
move the perturbation m pixels every time within the
neighborhood, for each m, we have at most eight direc-
tions, left, right, top, bottom and top-left, bottom-left,
top-right, bottom-right, for physical misplacement. If the
perturbation is still adversarial when suffering from the
physical misplacement, it means that the perturbation
can tolerate this misplacement. The more times a per-
turbation can tolerate the misplacement, the more ro-
bustness it is. Based on this idea, we fine-tune the per-
turbation to tolerate the possible physical misplacement
according to the following equation:
m,d = arg max
m∈M,d∈D
|∑x∈X(Att(x + rm,d) = Suc)|
|X| , (3)
where rm,d is the generated perturbation r moving m
pixels along the direction d. M is the set of values that
m can choose in the neighborhood of r. D is the eight di-
rections that r can move to. The numerator denotes the
number of successful attacks for all the input in X when
r suffering from the physical misplacement. The denom-
inator is the total number of images in X. According to
this equation, r will achieve the best misplacement tol-
erance when moving m pixels to the direction d, which
is the final perturbation location after fine-tuning.
4.2 Photography Independent Fine-tuning
In the physical world, many inevitable photographic
variations, such as photographic angles, distances and so
on, may degrade the attack robustness, as the taken im-
ages will be different due to these variations. In this sec-
tion, we propose a photography independent fine-tuning
mechanism to improve the attack robustness. The key
idea is to generate the input images under varying pho-
tography conditions and craft the perturbation that can
attack successfully under most conditions. To achieve
this goal, we modify the region selection standard in the
top-down and bottom-up methods. Instead of evaluat-
ing the adversarial capability of a region on one input
image, we evaluate it with a number of inputs. In this
way, the crafted region-wise perturbations can largely
increase the attack robustness in the physical world.
The new region selection standard for the un-targeted
attacks is reformulated as follows:
ri+1 = arg min
ri∈R
∑
x∈X ftrue(x + ri)
|X| , (4)
where x is an image of the object under one specific
situation and X is a set of images taken in varying con-
ditions. We select ri that can largely degrade the average
of the classification probability of the true label for all
the inputs in X.
Similarly, for the targeted attacks, the perturbation
selection standard is reformulated as follows:
ri+1 = arg max
ri∈R
∑
x∈X ftarget(x + ri)
|X| . (5)
The perturbation that can largely increase the average
of the classification probability of the targeted malicious
label for all the inputs in X will be selected.
In our method, the input image set X is obtained by
the data augmentation through physical and synthetic
transformations. For example, if we target to attack the
stop sign, we will generate X by taking photos of the stop
sign under various conditions, such as changing photo-
graphic angles, lights or object distances. For the syn-
thetic transformation, we perform common digital im-
age transformations, such as changing the contrast or
rotating some angles.
5 Experiments
Our digital attack experiments are performed on CIFAR-
10 and GTSRB (German Traffic Sign Recognition
Benchmark) data sets. The size of the image in CIFAR-
10 is 32*32, and the size of the input in GTSRB is 64*64.
34%
48%
72%
96% 97% 97% 97%
22%
36%
62%
87% 87% 87% 87%
At
ta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 ra
te
(A
SR
)
Color Set Size 
GTSRB
Un-targeted
Targeted
36%
49%
68%
88%
97% 98% 98%
26%
37%
60%
82%
89% 89% 89%
At
ta
ck
 S
uc
ce
ss
 R
at
e 
(A
SR
)
Color Set Size
CIFAR-10
Un-targeted
Targeted
5 10 20 40 80 160 216 5 10 20 40 80 160 216
Figure 3: ASR vs. color set size for un-targeted attack. Figure 4: Scale digital perturbation to physical world.
White-box Method Exhaustive Search Ours (Continuous) Ours (Discontinuous)
ASR Runtime Query ASR Runtime Query ASR Runtime Query ASR Runtime Query
CIFAR-10
Un-targeted 93.0% 28.1 Secs - 93.2% 178.6 Secs 4,410 92.6% 3.2 Secs 432 97.4% 8.1 Secs 864
Targeted 85.4% 42.6 Secs - 83.0% 252.4 Secs 12,936 82.3% 5.2 Secs 568 89.4% 11.3 Secs 1,224
GTSRB
Un-targeted 92.3% 39.6 Secs - 92.6% 282.8 Secs 16,507 91.7% 4.6 Secs 504 96.5% 10.3 Secs 1,080
Targeted 82.9% 57.8 Secs - 82.5% 336.8 Secs 25,368 81.2% 8.7 Secs 672 87.2% 16.8 Secs 1,436
Table 1: Performance compared to the baselines considering the ASR, query number, and runtime.
The classification accuracy of the trained DNN model is
92.8% for CIFAR-10 and 98.8% for GTSRB on the test
sets, which are comparable to the state-of-art results.
We conduct all the experiments on the platform with
an AMD Threadripper 1950X CPU and four NVIDIA
GTX 1080 GPUs. In our bottom-up method, the ini-
tial number of perturbation regions k is set to 2 for the
discontinuous method. The adversarial label for the tar-
geted attack is randomly selected.
5.1 ASR VS. Color Set Size
As discussed in previous sections, the more colors we
explore, the larger attack success rate (ASR) we will
achieve. In this section, we evaluate the influence of the
color set size on the ASR. Figure 3 shows the ASR of
1000 correctly classified test images on the two data sets.
The color set is randomly selected from the 216 web safe
colors. We can see that the ASR increases quickly when
the color size is small, but it will saturate when the color
size is greater than 80 for CIFAR-10. That is to say, when
the color size is large enough, increasing the color size
may not bring ASR increase. The discovery for GTSRB
is similar. The ASR will not increase when the color
size is greater than 40. The number of colors needed for
CIFAR-10 is larger than that for GTSRB, which can be
explained that the images in CIFAR-10 are more color-
ful than GTSRB, thus it is necessary to explore more
colors to achieve the successful attack. Please be noted
that even we explore all the 216 colors, some inputs are
still difficult to be attacked.
5.2 Runtime Comparison
Baselines As we generate region-wise perturbations un-
der black-box settings and there are no such existing at-
tacks, we use a white-box attack, [Eykholt et al., 2018],
as one of a baseline, in which region-wise perturbations
are crafted to mimic city graffiti. It should be noted that
it is not practical to attack real world systems under the
white-box setting and we use it as a baseline only to show
the advantages of our proposed methods. The second
baseline we choose is an exhaustive search method that
searches all the possible locations of the region-wise per-
turbations. We evaluate the performance of our method
compared to the baselines under the constraint that the
maximum number of perturbed pixels is the same. It is
1.6% of the total number of pixels of the input image
and the region shape is rectangular.
Table 1 shows the number of queries, ASR and runtime
of three methods, in which we can see that our method
with discontinuous region separation achieves the high-
est ASR and the lowest runtime consumption compared
to the two baselines. This is because our method ex-
plores multiple colors and discontinuous regions for at-
tack while the white-box method can only generate black
region-wise perturbation, as they set perturbation re-
gions to 1, and the exhaustive search method can only
generate continuous perturbations. Moreover, this bene-
fit of runtime is more obvious for GTSRB. As the query
needed for the exhaustive search method increases about
4 times for CIFAR-10, it only increases 1.2 times for
our methods. This is because for the exhaustive search
method, the query needed is highly relevant to the in-
put size. Our methods use a greedy search technique, in
which the query number will not be influenced much by
the input size.
5.3 Physical Attack Results
Physical Experimental Process. To evaluate the ro-
bustness of our attack in the physical world, we conduct
experiments on real world road signs. Firstly, we collect
the digital images of road signs in the physical world,
and then scale the images into 64*64 pixels that is the
input size of the trained GTSRB model. Secondly, we
send these digital images into the DNN model and craft
the region-wise perturbations using the proposed attack
methods. Thirdly, we scale the digital region-wise per-
“50 Speed Limited” “Straight Drive” “No Entry”
Targeted Un-Targeted Targeted Un-Targeted Targeted Un-Targeted
Gaussian Blur
Our(w/o FT) 63.0% 82.6% 64.9% 83.2% 63.9% 82.4%
Our(FT) 87.3% 95.3% 89.2% 95.8% 87.6% 94.4%
Contrast Change
Our(w/o FT) 63.4% 82.2% 65.3% 83.0% 64.2% 82.6%
Our(FT) 87.7% 95.4% 89.8% 95.7% 87.9% 94.9%
Table 2: Robustness of adversarial attacks under synthetic transformations.
Figure 5: Attack performance under varying shooting
distances and angles where the targeted malicious label
is ”Straight Drive”.
0’ 0 0’ 15 1’ 0 1’ 15
Clean Signs
Our (w/o FT)
Our (FT)
Distance(meter)/Angle
“50 Limited”: 0.98
“Straight Drive”: 0.46
“Straight Drive”: 0.59
“50 Limited”: 0.96 “50 Limited”: 0.92 “50 Limited”: 0.91
“Straight Drive”: 0.58 “Straight Drive”: 0.43 “50 Limited”: 0.52
“Straight Drive”: 0.53 “Straight Drive”: 0.52 “Straight Drive”: 0.53
turbations back to the real world size and stick them
onto road signs.
Physical Robustness Metric We compute the physi-
cal robustness (PR) of the region-wise perturbations in
physical world using the following formula:
PR =
∑
x∈X 1{F (x + r)T 6= y&F (x)T = y}∑
x∈X 1{F (x)T = y}
, (6)
where r denotes the region-wise perturbation and T de-
notes the transformations in real world. y is the ground
truth label. This formula is for un-targeted attacks. For
targeted attack, the constraint F (x + r)T 6= y should
change to F (x + r)T = y∗ where y∗ is the adversarial
label. This equation ensures that the misclassification is
caused by the added perturbations instead of other fac-
tors.
Digital to Physical Mapping After generating the
digital region-wise perturbations, we should map them
back to the physical world. The size of the adversarial
perturbations and their locations should be scaled con-
sidering the real world traffic signs. We call this process
as digital to physical mapping, as shown in Figure 4. The
idea is that using a rectangular box to bound the road
signs in the digital image, and then we calculate the rela-
tive size and location of the perturbation with respect to
the bounding box. Next, the perturbation for real world
attacks is scaled and attached according to the size of
real world road signs.
Physical Results Figure 5 shows the physical at-
tack performance of our region-wise perturbations under
varying shooting distances and angles for targeted at-
tacks on “50 Speed Limited” road sign. The values below
each image represent the predicted label and its predic-
tion confidence given by the GTSRB model. The adver-
sarial perturbations are generated based on the digital
images photographed under a specific distance and angle,
denoted as 0 distance and 0 angle. We can see that our
method without using the fine-tuning mechanisms can
tolerate most conditions, but failed when the shooting
distance and angle changed to 1 meter and 15◦. How-
ever, after using the fine-tuning mechanisms that find a
more robust location near the neighborhood, the pertur-
bation now can tolerate all the physical variations.
To simulate other complex situations in physical
world, we use synthetic transformations to evaluate our
methods. The results for contrast change and gaussian
blur transformations are shown in Table 2. For each road
sign, we take 100 times, and then do synthetic trans-
formations under 10 different parameter settings. For
the gaussian blur, we change the standard deviation of
added noise from 0.01 to 0.1 with the step size of 0.01.
For contrast change, we increase the contrast parameter
from 1.1 to 2 with the step size of 0.1. Therefore, we
get 1000 test samples for each transformation. From Ta-
ble 2, we can see that our region-wise perturbation can
achieve a good performance under different transforma-
tions, where the robustness with the fine-tuning mech-
anisms increases about 15% for the un-targeted attack,
and increases about 36% for the targeted attack com-
pared to the method without fine-tuning. These results
demonstrate that our top-down and bottom-up methods
with fine-tuning mechanisms are very effective to gen-
erate robust adversarial perturbations under black-box
settings.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose Region-Wise Attack, a novel
technique to efficiently generate robust physical ad-
versarial examples under the black-box setting. Top-
down and bottom-up methods are presented to efficiently
find the appropriate colors, locations and shapes of the
region-wise perturbations. To further increase the attack
robustness, we introduce two fine-tuning techniques to
tolerate possible variations in the real world. Experimen-
tal results on CIFAR-10, GTSRB and real-world attacks
show that our proposed method can achieve very high
attack success rate only using black-box queries.
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